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Abstract The main contention of this paper is that our
ability to embed a consideration of values into business
school curricula is hampered by certain normative param-
eters that our students have when entering the classroom. If
we don’t understand the processes of valuation that
underpin our students’ reasoning, our ethics teaching will
inevitably miss its mark. In this paper, we analyze one of
the most prevalent metaphors that underpin moral argu-
ments about business, and reveal the beliefs and assump-
tions that underpin it. By revisiting the content of Adam
Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ metaphor, we show that the
moral content of the metaphor has been significantly mis-
construed through its subsequent reception in economic
theory. The ‘‘Giving Voice to Values’’ (GVV) pedagogy
aims to enable students to act on their tacit values and
address the rationalizations that they may encounter for not
acting on these values (Gentile in Giving voice to values.
How to speak your mind when you know what’s right, Yale
University Press, Yale, 2010a; Discussions about ethics in
the accounting classroom: student assumptions and faculty
paradigms, Darden Business Publishing,2010b. http://store.
darden.virginia.edu/Syllabus%20Copy/Discussions-about-
Ethics-in-Accounting_S.pdf; Educating for values-driven
leadership across the curriculum: giving voice to values,
Business Expert Press, New York, 2013). We believe our
analysis can strengthen the employment of GVV in three
ways: (1) understanding tacit blockages to moral action,
i.e., how students’ belief in the moral efficacy of the
invisible hand could undermine their own sense of moral
duty; (2) addressing common rationalizations that may
emerge from different assumptions about morally appro-
priate courses of action in the workplace; and (3) resolving
values conflicts on how to act.
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Introduction
What is often missed in our consideration of ethics teach-
ing is what our students already value when they walk into
our classrooms. Points of normative orientation emerge
within the broader context of capitalism, and as such,
already constrain how our students can think about ethics
in business (Painter-Morland 2015). Though most students
will espouse their adherence to the values of ‘‘justice,’’
‘‘honesty,’’ or ‘‘care,’’ we believe that a deeper under-
standing of the processes of valuation that underpin our
students’ moral reasoning is required. This will allow us to
have more meaningful conversations with students about
their most basic beliefs, and stimulate their critical reflec-
tion about their own values. It will also enable us to
understand, and challenge, the ‘‘scripts’’ that shape stake-
holders’ rationalizations of their behavior, and their own.
In this way, our paper outlines a study of values that
complements and extends the ‘‘Giving Voice to Values’’
approach (Gentile 2010a, b, 2013). Mary Gentile
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(2010a, b, 2013) developed this approach with the support
of many prominent institutions, including the Aspen
Institute (as Incubator and Founding Partner), Yale School
of Management (Founding Partner), Babson College, and
most recently, Darden Business School.1 GVV, more than
any other business school pedagogy, acknowledges that
students enter the classroom with distinct ‘‘tacit orienta-
tions.’’ In this paper, we hope to illustrate that misinter-
pretations of the invisible hand metaphor allow business
practitioners to believe that it is acceptable to abdicate their
own moral duties because the invisible hand takes care of
it. In this way, our analysis may provide additional impetus
to the deployment of GVV.
This is not to say that all (or even most) students are
familiar with the term ‘‘invisible hand,’’ Adam Smith, or
the ‘‘First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics’’
which is a prominent modern reinterpretation of Smith’s
metaphor. Whether or not students are familiar with the
metaphor itself, its author, or the modern economics the-
orem, they have been exposed to the idea of Pareto effi-
ciency indirectly in contexts ranging from their finance
courses to pop culture. The idea that perfectly competitive
markets result in an efficient allocation of resources is a
tacit assumption with which students enter the classroom.
Students may not be aware that they are indirectly referring
to Smith’s metaphor when they claim that ‘‘the markets
should be left alone,’’ nor do they necessarily know that the
notion of Pareto efficiency has nothing to do with fairness
or desirability. A better understanding of Smith’s invisible
hand metaphor in its original context will help address one
important cluster of tacit moral assumptions common to
many of today’s business students. This tacit assumption
allows students, and the stakeholders they encounter at
work, to think it morally appropriate to pursue profit as first
priority, which undermines their capacity to give voice to
other moral values in the workplace.
We believe that our analysis could therefore strengthen
an important dimension of the ‘‘Giving Voice to Values’’
pedagogy (Gentile 2010a, b), i.e., exploring the tacit ori-
entations and the valuation that underpin our gut-level
response to what is right and wrong. In the case of the
invisible hand, this means that students have to be enabled
to understand the tacit ‘‘Pareto efficiency’’ beliefs that
underpin key stakeholders’ understanding of what is
morally appropriate and to be able to challenge these
assumptions, in order to transform paradigms as a result.
Gentile’s (2011) approach starts from the assumption that
most, albeit not all students, know what is right and that we
should focus on empowering them to act on these values
and helping them to counter the rationalizations of uneth-
ical behavior that they may face. The GVV curriculum is
built on the idea that the student body can be regarded as a
bell curve: the majority of students are ‘‘pragmatists,’’
interested in acting on their values within the constraints of
a business context; only on the tail ends of the curve do we
find ‘‘idealists’’ (who have a strong if perhaps less realistic
moral compass) and the ‘‘opportunists,’’ the small group of
students who value self-interest above all else (Gentile
2012, p. 191). We support the contention that students
arrive with a particular conception of what is morally
appropriate, and hope to use metaphor analysis to offer
additional ways to reveal the way in which students’ tacit
normative understanding shape their conception of what is
‘‘right,’’ and concomitantly, how they perceive their
available courses of action. In this way, we hope to suggest
ways to supplement the goals of the GVV, which as Arce
and Gentile (2015, p. 538) explain include: (1) transform-
ing paradigms, (2) reconsidering the goals of the system,
and (3) empower students to add, change, systems or allow
it to evolve or self-organize. In order to do so, we argue,
one should understand the existing paradigms that shape
students’ valuation, and analyze how the current under-
standing of the goals of system emerged over time.
Another one of the main strengths of the GVV pedagogy
is that it helps students to counter rationalizations that may
undermine the possibility of taking morally appropriate
action.2 Gentile (2010a, b) suggests the following steps in
dealing with rationalizations:
• What are the main arguments you are trying to counter?
That is, what are the reasons and rationalizations you
need to address?
• What is at stake for the key parties, including those who
disagree with you?
• What levers can you use to influence those who
disagree with you?
• What is your most powerful and persuasive response to
the reasons and rationalizations you need to address?
To whom should the argument be made? When and in
what context? (Gentile 2010a, b, Kindle Edition
Location 2251)
What therefore seems necessary for GVV to hit the mark is
(1) to understand the assumptions lying behind rational-
izations not to take moral actions and (2) to resolve the
value tensions that key stakeholders have in order to
facilitate moral action. The argument in this paper unfolds1 GVV is also viewed as one of the main pedagogies for responsible
management education by the Principles for Responsible Manage-
ment Education (PRME). As such, we deemed it appropriate to
present this paper as part of the IVBEC 2016 Conference call on ‘‘UN
Global Compact and UN PRME: What We Practice and What We
Teach in Business Ethics.’’
2 http://www.babson.edu/Academics/teaching-research/gvv/Docu
ments/Student/Reasons-and-Rationalizations_S.pdf. Last visited May
27, 2016.
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as follows: We start by drawing on the work of Friedrich
Nietzsche in order to understand the metaphoric nature of
values. Nietzsche’s analysis of morality offers us the
opportunity to both understand our moral impulses better,
and to critically reflect on our own values. We will there-
fore relate Nietzsche’s analysis of values and moral truth to
Adam Smith’s perspective on moral sentiments, which
provides the context for his use of the metaphor of the
‘‘invisible hand.’’ Though the ‘‘invisible hand’’ has become
one of Smith’s most quoted phrases and one of the most
prominent metaphors underpinning rationalizations in the
business environment, Smith made very sparse reference to
‘‘the invisible hand’’ in his oeuvre. We propose that the
form of valuation that has become associated with Smith’s
invisible hand be rethought in a way that is more aligned
with the rest of his oeuvre. Revisiting the content of Adam
Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ metaphor may allow us to
understand moral sentiments as a search for harmony, and
find an answer to the question why so many seek this
harmony through calculations around monetary wealth.
This may allow us to resolve some of the value tensions
emerging in the workplace. We end the paper by proposing
a supplement to ‘‘Giving Voice to Values,’’ which allows
us to better understand the origins of the values that we
refer to in business, and the rationalizations and scripts that
are typically employed in organizational contexts, in order
to support morally appropriate action.
Understanding What is at Stake for Human Actors
in Business
Nietzsche makes us aware of the fact that it is an interest in
human relations that lead us to formulate metaphoric
responses to the threats we may perceive. Nietzsche (1954,
p. 42) drew on the insights of the scholars of his time to
conclude that every language is a dictionary of faded meta-
phors.3 He believed that figures of speech and rhetoric pre-
ceded all conceptualization. Nietzsche argues that all
language displays certain anthropologically necessary con-
structions that help us to organize our environment and make
sense of experience (Emden 2005, p. 79). It can therefore
help us develop insight into what lies behind the main
arguments against moral action and develop a better under-
standing of what is at stake for all the parties involved.
There is much support for Nietzsche’s view of meta-
phoric language in contemporary moral philosophy. John-
son (2007, p. 12) argues convincingly that any kind of
meaning, and therefore also moral meaning, is grounded in
our bodily experience. Meaning emerges from continuous
organism–environment interactions, and as such, our
‘‘values’’ are nothing more than responses to our sensori-
motor experiences, our feelings, and our visceral connec-
tions to the world. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explain the
relationship between our sensory experience and abstract
thought by discussing our use of conceptual metaphors.
Our conceptual metaphors are defined by systematic
mappings from body-based, sensorimotor inputs onto more
abstract target domains (Johnson 2007, p. 177). If we
therefore want to understand our ideas about how we
should live, we are well served by exploring the metaphors
that we have adopted as part of our everyday language.
Studying metaphors offers access to tacit belief structures
in organizational contexts (Morgan 1980; Alvesson 1993;
Hart 2008; Tay 2010). As De Graaf (2006, p. 252) notes,
metaphors carry implicit ‘‘moral baggage.’’ In fact, one can
argue that all moral language is inherently metaphorical.
Studying metaphors allows us to recognize how certain
values emerge in the process of our embodied engagement in
advancing business’ most basic goals. In the case of Smith’s
invisible hand, the implicit moral baggage that it has picked
up over time seems far from Smith’s original intention. In
fact, there is little to suggest that Smith meant for his meta-
phor to serve as a moral prescription. The moral corollary to
Smith’s invisible hand metaphor is not present in Smith’s
work but ubiquitous in the 1990s after Friedman presented
his very particular reading of Smith (Friedman 1970;
Friedman and Friedman 1980). Bishop notes that even if
everyone ought to pursue their own interest, or is at least
permitted to, there is no reason to believe that self-interested
reasons are the only reasons for action (Bishop 1995). The
‘‘amorality in the executive suite’’ is very far removed from
Smith’s ideal of the virtuous, networked, socially embedded
and embodied person (Bishop 1995, p. 169; Bragues 2009). It
is also far removed from Nietzsche’s insistence that we
question conventional morality. In fact, it is precisely the
conventional interpretation of the invisible hand—that not
only Pareto efficiency but also a moral good is accomplished
if ‘‘the markets are left to do their work,’’ which we believe
should be critiqued.
It is interesting how Smith’s ‘‘simple metaphor’’ (Bevan
and Werhane 2015, p. 328) took on a decidedly normative
aspect in the late twentieth century while Smith’s explicitly
normative statements about frivolous luxury and what we
would today call conspicuous consumption fell by the
wayside (Brewer 2009, p. 521–524). As Bragues observes,
a Smithian business ethics would be concerned with ‘‘the
individual pursuit of excellence within companies, rooted
in a concern for the moral worthiness of one’s own char-
acter’’ (Bragues 2009, p. 449). Nietzsche and Smith share
an insistence on moral autonomy, and though they describe
the process of reaching it in quite different ways, both
3 See Emden’s discussion of how Nietzsche drew on the work of Jean
Paul and a host of other scholars of his time to develop his metaphoric
account of truth.
Strengthening ‘‘Giving Voice to Values’’ in Business Schools by Reconsidering the ‘‘Invisible…
123
would resist allowing others, or institutions to dictate one’s
values. Nietzsche rejects the ‘‘slave morality,’’ which
makes human beings hostage to the values and priorities of
the ‘‘herd,’’ and as such is bound to lead to ‘‘ressentiment’’
(Romar 2009, p. 62).
Invisible hand arguments have traditionally been used to
justify laissez-faire capitalism. The insistence of human
freedom has led economists like Hayek and others to
advocate free market capitalism, which advocates indi-
vidual ‘‘independence’’ as core value (Romar 2009, p. 63).
Yet the moral implication of this is that individuals abdi-
cate their moral autonomy to the notion of efficient mar-
kets. We believe there is something distinctly herdlike in
an uncritical acceptance of this moral implication of the
invisible hand. Most popular invisible hand arguments
(Friedman’s being the most famous, 1970; see also Fried-
man and Friedman 1980) fail to accurately reflect Smith’s
original metaphor. Reading Smith’s elaborate account of
virtue and moral character in The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments is the best way to redefine and reinvent his ‘‘capi-
talism’’ as it has come to be understood (Bevan and
Werhane 2015; Bassiry and Jones 1993; Griswold 1999;
Rothschild 1992, 2001).
For Nietzsche, the construction of values is part of the
creative process that keeps us alive, both physically and
mentally (Evans and Wurster 1999). Nietzsche’s analysis
of values allows us to understand it as a central part of
‘‘peace-pacts’’ that we enter into to ward off the fragility
and precariousness of human life. We find similar obser-
vations in Smith scholarship about the invisible hand and
its role in contemporary business. Bragues, for example,
argues that ‘‘Smith’s moral analysis incorporates the core
principle of the social networks approach—namely, that to
fully comprehend human activity, we must focus primarily
on the interdependencies among actors, instead of viewing
social phenomena merely as the result of individual attri-
butes’’ (Bragues 2009, p. 448). Smith’s account of impar-
tial spectatorship, discussed below, provides a framework
that helps us understand ourselves as networked beings,
connected to the world through sentiment. Our ‘‘values’’
can be understood only if we first recognize the fact that
these sentiments come first and drive our moral judgments
of others and ourselves.
One of the Nietzsche’s most succinct articulations of the
relationship between emotions and moral convictions is his
claim that morality is the ‘‘sign-language of the emotions’’
(Nietzsche 1966, p. 92). Though Nietzsche argued that our
moral values are directly linked to what we desire, he did
not see values as completely random, momentary prefer-
ences. Nietzsche insisted that affect is not arbitrary. For
him, it tells the story of who a person is. Smith, too,
regarded morality as rooted in the emotions—hence his
theory of moral sentiments. And like Nietzsche, Smith
links affect to who we are as persons; our judgments of
moral (dis)approbation are to be relied on only if our
capacity for sympathy has been adequately developed. The
extent to which we can engage with the world with the
right mixture of sympathy and impartial distance discloses
who we are as moral agents (Griswold 1999; Raphael
2007).
Nietzsche believed that individuals are shaped by a
specific combination of nature, nurture and life-circum-
stances. It also provides clues about the kind of life that a
person is suited to. Nietzsche correlates ethical values,
motivations, and practices to pre-ethical facts about the
human beings who espouse them. Valuing, for Nietzsche,
is also directly related to one’s seeking and attainment of
power. Nietzsche challenges his readers to acknowledge
the nature of values and to choose values that give creative
form to the lives they desire. Since life systems are always
evolving, our perceptions of good and evil are also bound
to change (Oakes and Smith 2013, p. 130). There are no
absolute standards to live by; rather, we have to constantly
be responsive to our environments. Values, in his estima-
tion, will always be derived from someone’s particular
desires and emotions. He therefore urges us not to allow
other people’s goals and priorities to determine our own
values. Smith recognizes that this is easier said than done,
as he regards the desire to be esteemed as a common (al-
most universal) human emotion. But how we get this
esteem, and what we want to be esteemed for, is not pre-
determined. That said, it is difficult to escape the dominant
opinion that status and wealth are the preferred means to
get recognition—even if the rich and the wealthy are not
necessarily morally good or even happy. ‘‘The rich and the
great are too often preferred to the wise and the virtuous,’’
and because this prejudice is deeply embedded in society it
will shape the values of the majority (Smith 2009, p. 267).
Similarly, within the context of a business organization,
employees learn what is appreciated and appropriate
through both deliberate instruction and tacit socialization
(Trevin˜o 1999). For instance, if risk-taking is valued within
an organization, employees may be encouraged to take
risks through the introduction of rewards programs, or
other forms of recognition. Over time, risk-taking becomes
associated with such rewards and a sense of accomplish-
ment and employees begin to lose their fear. In another
organization where due care, consultation, and risk-
averseness are valued, fear, or at least circumspection, may
gradually become reinforced as an appropriate emotional
response to risk. Emotions are therefore not ‘‘irrational.’’
They are based on a family of beliefs about the worth of
particular things. Although such beliefs may be so appro-
priate in one context that they begin to be seen as part of
the natural order of things, they may seem completely
nonsensical to those who function under another set of
M. Painter-Morland, R. Slegers
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circumstances (Nussbaum 1996, p. 93). What this suggests
is that the material, institutional, and relational life that is
cultivated within an organizational system informs the
moral responsiveness of those who participate in it.
In what follows we engage in a deeper level of ques-
tioning to identify the emergence of patterns of valuation
within capitalist institutions, which shape moral discourse
in business contexts. To take up Nietzsche’s (1973) chal-
lenge, we will need to get down to asking what informs our
very first associations of well-being with wealth, and
maybe more urgently, how we have come to associate
wealth and well-being with monetary wealth. In order to do
so, we will explore one particularly powerful metaphor,
namely that of the ‘‘invisible hand.’’ A re-valuation and
redefinition of Smith’s invisible hand helps along the cre-
ative process of enhancement, while leaving Smith’s
metaphor unexamined closes off the opportunity to project
higher possibilities in business ethics.
Understanding the Rationalizations that Prevent
Moral Actions
To support the GVV pedagogy, we challenge the tacit
assumptions and beliefs that underpin one of the main
metaphors employed in arguing for not interfering with the
market’s functioning, i.e., Adam Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand.’’
A belief in the efficacy of the invisible hand in distributing
the positive effects of profit maximization not only pre-
vents students from moral action that may run counter to
the profit-motive, but it makes the pursuit of profit as first
priority seem like a moral imperative.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) point out that one of the
most basic structures of our moral language is the ‘‘Well-
being is wealth’’ construct. Our basic bodily need for well-
being makes it inevitable that an increase in well-being is
defined as a gain, and any impediment to well-being as a
loss, or a cost. This ‘‘accounting’’ scheme seems evident in
everyday phrases like, ‘‘investing in relationships,’’ or
‘‘profiting from hard work.’’ What becomes evident here is
that a certain type of ‘‘moral accounting’’ is operating
within the metaphors that are employed in corporate con-
texts. As long as something works to increase well-being/
wealth, it is morally acceptable (Painter-Morland 2015).
This reliance on some notion of ‘‘moral accounting’’
therefore also informs our acceptance of moral arguments
regarding the acceptability of ‘‘trickle-down economics’’ or
beliefs in the efficacy of the ‘‘invisible hand.’’
Ironically, this kind of ‘‘moral accounting’’ is contrary
to Adam Smith’s own position. Smith’s moral theory is not
utilitarian, but founded on (and never really moving
beyond) moral ‘‘sentiments.’’ For Smith, our sense of
morality has to do with our sympathy for others, and the
desire to be sympathized with, to feel like others respect us.
To feel like others sympathize with us increases our well-
being: the more acknowledgment we receive, the better. At
the same time, we notice that the wealthy get respect
because of their wealth (and not, or at least not primarily,
because of their moral virtues) and this suggests to us that
we can also gain status by becoming rich. Once this link
between sympathy, respect, and status on the one hand and
monetary wealth on the other becomes established in our
minds, we will likely start to care less about our moral
character. We may still acknowledge that virtues are
important, but wealth is usually much more visible than
character and so we are tempted to take what we believe is
the easier path to sympathy and esteem—even if the kind
of sympathy evoked by monetary wealth does not directly
or necessarily pertain to who we are (our moral character).
Taylor (2004), for instance, argued that the bodily
metaphor of the ‘‘invisible hand’’ is preoccupied with
establishing harmony, much like the aesthetic pleasure we
derive from beautiful things. Smith suggests that we love
harmony and want to see it around us, even if perfect
harmony is an ever-elusive state. Many of us think we
desire a ‘‘never-ending increase in wealth,’’ while in fact it
is our (frequently unconscious) ‘‘love of system and
machines’’ that drives us to seek wealth and power (Di-
atkine 2010, pp. 396–400). Though Smith is dismissive of
the ‘‘trinkets of frivolous utility’’ flaunted by the rich, he
recognizes the common attempt to gain status through this
‘‘ultimately futile form of esteem-seeking that creates the
opulence of modern society’’ (Luban 2012, p. 302).
Smith’s pessimistic views on people’s ability to overcome
their obsession with ‘‘trinkets’’ are borne out by the pre-
dominant twentieth-century understanding of the invisible
hand metaphor as a market mechanism.
Smith’s strange legacy and the appropriation of the
invisible hand metaphor have been discussed at length in
the literature (e.g., Nozick 1994; Grampp 2000; Wight
2007). Clearly, there is a big difference between Smith’s
invisible hand and the ‘‘invisible hand arguments’’ that
sprang up in the twentieth century. Smith himself likely did
not mean for it to be an argument at all, but a rather
modest, ‘‘simple metaphor’’ (Bevan and Werhane 2015).
Macleod (2007) explains in detail where Friedman takes
great liberties with Smith’s text, and Rothschild makes
some of the same points in greater detail (Rothschild 2001,
p. 116–153). In what follows, we provide a brief overview
of the context and meaning each of Smith’s mentions of the
invisible hand, and reflect on how it has been subsequently
misconstrued.
Adam Smith mentions the ‘‘invisible hand’’ three times:
once in ‘‘The Theory of Astronomy’’ (written around 1750
but published posthumously), once in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments, and once in The Wealth of Nations. It is
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remarkable that the author of thousands of pages of pub-
lished work is today largely identified with a phrase that
occurs no more than three times in his oeuvre. Further-
more, each mention of the invisible hand is cursory and at
least one of them appears mildly ironic (Rothschild 2001,
p. 117, 130–131). In each instance, the people moved by
the invisible hand are far from moral exemplars (at least by
Smith’s standards) and there is little in Smith’s writing to
suggest that the invisible hand should be relied upon
(let alone relied upon exclusively) to order society (Roth-
schild 2001; Bishop 1995).
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith writes about
‘‘the proud and unfeeling landlord:’’ ‘‘The homely and
vulgar proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never
was more fully verified than with regard to him’’ (Smith
2009, p. 214). This insatiable landlord is like many rich
people:
They consume little more than the poor, and in spite
of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they
mean only their own conveniency, though the sole
end which they propose from the labours of all the
thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of
their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with
the poor the produce of all their improvements. They
are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same
distribution of the necessaries of life, which would
have been made, had the earth been divided into
equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the
interest of the society, and afford means to the mul-
tiplication of the species (Smith 2009, p. 215).
Despite their ‘‘selfishness and rapacity,’’ and despite the
fact that the improvement of society is in no way part of
their intentions, they create jobs (or, on some readings,
merely food, e.g., Brewer 2009) and therefore means for
the poor to obtain a share of the ‘‘necessaries of life.’’
These necessaries should be distinguished from the luxury
objects and services pursued by the rich to satisfy their
vanity; all Smith claims here is that the selfish actions of
the rich provide the poor with opportunity to buy the (bare)
necessities needed to live and multiply. Nowhere in the
Theory of Moral Sentiments does Smith suggest that this
observation should be translated into economic policy, and
the invisible hand is neither mentioned nor referred to
anywhere else in the book. More importantly, much of the
Theory is devoted to the description of character, virtue,
and vice—and the virtuous person as Smith describes him
or her is nothing like the proud and unfeeling landlord from
the excerpt above. In fact, Smith’s ideal moral agent is
deeply concerned with ‘‘the moral worthiness of [his or
her] own character’’ (Bragues 2009, p. 449) and strives for
‘‘impartial spectatorship,’’ a notion to which Smith devoted
significantly more attention than to the invisible hand.
Rothschild suggests in Economic Sentiments that the
invisible hand here should be seen as an ‘‘obviating
device’’ (Rothschild 2009, p. 144): even where it concerns
the most pompous and ‘‘rapacious’’ people in society, it is
better to leave them to the invisible hand than to enforce a
policy thought up by a (likely) pompous and rapacious
sovereign or despot.
The invisible hand in the Theory of Astronomy (2013)
directs not the rapacious rich but ‘‘savages.’’ Smith
describes their polytheism as a ‘‘vulgar superstition’’ in
which ‘‘all the irregular events of nature’’ (like thunder and
lightning) are ascribed to supernatural beings while things
like the refreshing quality of water and the fact that fire
burns are accepted without the need to refer to ‘‘the
invisible hand of Jupiter.’’ ‘‘And thus,’’ Smith writes, ‘‘in
the first ages of the world, the lowest and most pusillani-
mous superstition supplied the place of philosophy.’’
(Smith 2013, Kindle loc. 474–479) Smith here mocks and
condemns the belief in an invisible hand (here belonging to
Jupiter) and its subjects, once again, are a far cry from the
morally responsible citizens Smith admires in the Theory.
The most famous articulation of the invisible hand is
found in the Wealth of Nations. This time the subject of the
invisible hand is an Amsterdam merchant who prefers to
support domestic industry because it is more likely to
provide him with security. ‘‘He intends only his own gain;
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part
of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it’’ (Smith 2012a, b, p. 168). This
articulation of the invisible hand underlies most of the
popular contemporary interpretations of Smith’s metaphor,
including the common assumption that the Pareto effi-
ciency accomplished by the invisible hand is a moral good
and a fair state of affairs. Like the rapacious rich in the
Theory, the merchant in the Wealth of Nations is not
concerned with the good of society—but this is not ‘‘al-
ways the worse’’ for society. Society is frequently better
served by those who do not intend to promote it—here
again we see Smith’s hesitation to believe that people will
even be able to set aside their ‘‘love of domination and
authority’’ (Luban 2012, p. 277). The invisible hand may,
in some instances, help improve the consequences of the
actions of morally weak characters—but this improvement
is not a great feat as the bar is set very low by the agent’s
selfish intentions.
Smith himself took an aesthetic delight in system
building, analyzing, and conceptualizing (Diatkine 2010).
But it is unlikely that for Smith himself the invisible hand
was an essential part of his theory. Whether it was a
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‘‘mildly ironic joke’’ and ‘‘obviating device’’ (Rothschild
2001), a ‘‘simple metaphor’’ transformed and misappro-
priated in the twentieth century (Bevan and Werhane
2015), or a trace of Stoic providence (Brown 1993) in
Smith’s thought—a reading of the Theory and the Wealth
of Nations in their entirety shows that the invisible hand did
not occupy the center of Smith’s own thought. The sug-
gestion of a providential force controlling and ordering
society is perhaps what made the notion of an invisible
hand so appealing in the twentieth century—a justification
for laissez-faire economics that could appeal to both those
wanting to believe in the invisible hand of a (Christian)
God and social Darwinists presenting capitalism as a
‘‘natural’’ struggle for survival (a view critiqued by, e.g.,
Klein 2003). Smith’s preoccupations in his major works do
not easily align with any part of this interpretation.
Resolving Moral Tensions and Procuring Moral
Action: Smith on Sympathy and the Desire
for Harmony
In all three articulations of the invisible hand, Smith
appears to make observations rather than offer prescrip-
tions of the sort found in Friedman (1970). As Bevan and
Werhane (2015, p. 330) observe, the ‘‘managerial pre-
scriptivism’’ advocated by Friedman is far removed from
Smith’s philosophy, in which the moral self, agency, and
conscience are all dependent on the relationships with
others. We care about how others see us, and we try to
imagine what we look like to them. This can help motivate
us to exercise self-control and adopt virtues for which we
can (rightly) expect to be praised, but our preoccupation
with our reputation, image, or status can also make us
believe that wealth is the surest (and most commonly
accepted) way to get the acknowledgment we crave.
Since Smith spends much of the Theory trying to con-
vince his readers that a good character is to be preferred
over status and monetary wealth, there is reason to wonder
whether this is another instance of Smithian irony. It is
after all a deception that drives us to accumulate wealth—
Smith holds that the ‘‘toil and anxiety’’ never ends, and that
virtue, not wealth, is what is truly praiseworthy. Even when
we are praised for our wealth or status, we sense that this
does not necessarily mean that we are praiseworthy—
somewhere deep down we realize that we have taken a
shortcut and that our wealth is not necessarily a reflection
or the result of our good character. As Macleod (2007)
observes, it may be the case that ‘‘it is the desire for wealth
and not self-interest which motivates economic agents,’’
because our (true) long-term interest is to be not merely the
recipient of praise but a praiseworthy person. We desire to
be acknowledged by others, to be liked and sympathized
with, and when we see rich people and feel ourselves
admiring and envying them, we cannot help but feel that it
would be good to be them. We also admire the wise and
virtuous, but they simply lack the grandeur and splendor of
the wealthy and so we are less motivated to imitate them.
The way others see us shapes how we look at ourselves,
and to help us focus on our moral qualities. Smith
encourages us to look at ourselves the way a stranger
would. ‘‘Live with strangers, with those who know nothing,
or care nothing about your misfortune,’’ Smith (2009,
p. 177) recommends; when we look at ourselves from their
point of view, we get an impartial perspective on our
actions and this helps us tone down our self-interested
desires. This thought experiment is open to all of us even if
few of us may choose to perform it, instead focusing on the
accumulation of ‘‘frivolous trinkets’’ (Smith’s dismissive
description in the Theory of the wealth to which we aspire)
to gain the (cheap) esteem of others.
Though Smith does not appear to be very hopeful about
our ability to consistently prefer praiseworthiness to (mere)
praise, he firmly believes that we have a deep-seated desire
to be in harmony with others through sympathy. This
harmony, however, is of a different sort than optimistic
readings of the invisible hand metaphor suggest and can be
reached if we take seriously ‘‘the great precept of nature,’’
namely ‘‘to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour,
or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is
capable of loving us’’ (Smith 2009, p. 31). To bring about
what Smith calls the ‘‘harmony of sentiments’’ in the
Theory, we need the guidance of the impartial spectator.
When we take the perspective of the impartial spectator (a
theoretical entity at the heart of Smith’s moral theory), we
look at ourselves and others as a sympathetic stranger would,
i.e., someone who does not feel for us the way a friend would,
but who can identify with our troubles nonetheless—to the
reasonable extent that can be expected from strangers. The
words ‘‘sympathetic’’ and ‘‘impartial’’ crop up throughout
the Theory and both are potentially misleading. For Smith,
sympathy is the capacity to understand the emotions (not just
the painful ones) of others—but this does not mean that we
therefore necessarily approve of those emotions or the
actions that accompany them. In fact, sympathy is the
capacity that allows us to judge others and ourselves
appropriately. Without it, both approbation and disappro-
bation would be impossible. Smith opens the Theory with a
description of various instances where we ‘‘sympathize’’
with others in the broadest sense of the word: watching a
tight rope-dancer almost fall, seeing someone get hurt, etc.
(Smith 2009, p. 14–15). We flinch even before we have fully
understood what is going on. Smith uses these examples to
show that we are always already connected to those around
us and that sentiments often (if not always) precede reflec-
tion (Griswold 1999, p. 87; see also Klein 2003).
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Sympathy not only connects us to others but also allows
us to reflect on ourselves through others—especially (rel-
ative) strangers. We naturally tend to have too much
sympathy for ourselves, and the people close to us only
make things worse if they indulge us and allow us to
wallow in our grief, resentment, anger, etc. Furthermore,
we all have had the experience of looking upon someone
else’s trouble with little sympathy, especially when we feel
that they are indulging in self-pity. When we look at our-
selves through the eyes of the impartial spectator, we look
at ourselves the way we know others would look at us if
they were not biased about us (not particularly biased, that
is, Smith does not mean to say that anyone is completely
free of bias). So the spectator is impartial not because he or
she feels no emotion, but because he or she is not caught up
in a personal drama. Ideally, Smith argues, we would all
strengthen this impartial spectator (a kind of conscience in
the modern sense (Raphael 2007)) by surrounding our-
selves with many different people and adjusting the
‘‘pitch’’ of our emotions to accord with the sympathy we
can reasonably expect from those around us—strangers,
acquaintances, friends, etc. (Griswold 1999). This is where
the language of ‘‘harmony’’ is most relevant—we wish for
a harmony of sentiments, the sensation that others ‘‘hear’’
us the way we wish to be heard, just like we expect others
to adjust their pitch so that we feel in harmony with them
(rather than put off by, say, their exaggerated self-pity,
anger, resentment, etc.).
Being ‘‘impartial’’ for Smith means feeling the appro-
priate emotions to the appropriate extent and at the
appropriate time—just like we can appreciate a play only
if we allow ourselves to identify with the characters
(Griswold 1999, p. 113–146). In watching the play we
never completely lose our awareness of our distance to
the events on stage, but this distance does not prevent us
from engaging with the play emotionally. Similarly, the
impartial spectator sympathizes with us but only up to a
point—forcing us to see where we overstep the bound-
aries and expect too much sympathy from others, and
therefore from ourselves. When we feel that an impartial
spectator (and not someone out to flatter us because we
are a successful business person, say) would approve of
our actions, we sense that we are deserving of praise, i.e.,
praiseworthy.
Contrary to some Enlightenment positions that would
view impartiality as a rational distancing from others and
from one’s emotions, it connects us to others and moder-
ates between our own emotions and those of others. Society
is indispensible in this process because it provides us with a
mirror and encourages us to ‘‘examine our own conduct as
we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would
examine it.’’ As Griswold puts it: ‘‘the spectator is a per-
sonification of the public, of a point of view that abstracts
in a relevant way from that of the agent.’’ (135). Bragues
(2009) describes the ideal manager as someone with a very
active impartial spectator: ‘‘Smith’s ideal manager will
endeavour to personally live up to the standards enforced
by an impartial spectator of his conduct, a theoretical entity
reflecting the ethical requirements posed by the manager’s
social networks and stakeholder relationships’’ (Bragues
2009, p. 447). In this way, we become capable of moral
imagination (Werhane 1999).
Where it comes to Smith’s view on the importance of
moral education, his position is unequivocal. ‘‘The dif-
ference between the most dissimilar characters,’’ Smith
writes in the Wealth of Nations, ‘‘between a philosopher
and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise
not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and
education’’ (Smith 2012a, b, p. 6). Smith was a strong
proponent of universal education which he regarded as
the remedy for religious superstition and (political)
credulity. Smith did not want people to rely on an
invisible hand but think for themselves, about their own
interests and the interests of others, engaging their own
impartial spectator when appropriate. Nor did he want
them to be guided by the ‘‘visible hand’’ of a ‘‘man of
system’’—and a good education would ensure that peo-
ple could think and act autonomously and see through
political schemes.
We suggest that Smith’s impartial spectator offers a
richer and more instructive metaphor than the invisible
hand and that it can help counteract the undue importance
assigned to invisible hand arguments and the socio-politi-
cal fallacies that accompany them. ‘‘Impartial spectator-
ship’’ may allow students to better understand the ‘‘scripts’’
that shape their rationalizations of others’ behavior, and
their own.
By means of a good education, every individual can
think for himself or herself. The value of this intellectual
autonomy is not merely instrumental in nature; developing
the faculties of the understanding also enables the indi-
vidual to ‘‘wonder’’ and pursue this wonder through phi-
losophy (Smith 2013, Kindle Loc 492–494). If a boy grows
up without a proper education, ‘‘he has no ideas with which
he can amuse himself. When he is away from his work he
must therefore betake himself to drunkenness and riot…
These are the disadvantages of a commercial spirit. The
minds of men are contracted, and rendered incapable of
elevation’’ (Smith 2012a, b, Kindle Locations 4433–4434).
It is this ‘‘contraction of the mind’’ that we believe both
Nietzsche and Smith urge us to resist. In what follows, we
draw on our analysis to make suggestions on how the
Giving Voice to Values methodology may be supple-
mented to accomplish a critical interrogation of student’s
values, and the strengthening of their capacity to act in the
world.
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Supplementing ‘‘Giving voice to values’’ Approach
to Pedagogy
Though this paper will not attempt to offer a detailed
analysis of all the elements of the GVV approach, we do
believe that our analysis offers some interesting perspec-
tives on specific dimensions of the approach. To illustrate
our contribution, we will focus on one of the many exer-
cises in the GVV curriculum (Gentile 2013, Kindle loca-
tion 188).4 This specific exercise is called ‘‘A Tale of Two
Stories’’ and involves asking students to recall an instance
in which they had acted on their values, or spoken out, and
one instance when they did not. Students are then
encouraged to reflect on what they were considering as
relevant impediments/opportunities in each case. The three
dimensions that the analysis of any GVV case should
include are: (1) thinking through what is at stake for the
key parties (2) understanding the main arguments for doing
something unethical (3) considering the available levers
that would make it possible to take the ethical action (Arce
and Gentile 2015, p. 540).
We believe this exercise has significant potential for
addressing some of the problems that moral education in
business school faces (Starkey and Tempest 2009; Painter-
Morland 2015). We also believe that a closer analysis of
the metaphors that display the tacit values that inform
student’s response to this exercise could make it even more
effective. Among these problems count: the gap between
theory and practice (Augier and March 2007), the
stigmatization of goodness and inculcation of self-interest
and competitive behavior (Giacalone and Promislo 2013),
the absence of insight into the role of emotion and
embodiment, lack of insight in the systemic nature of moral
problems (Baets and Oldenboom 2009; Werhane 2011),
and ineffective development of the personal capacity for
critical reflection, and for dealing with ambiguity, power
and difference (Schoemaker 2008; De Dea Roglio and
Light 2009).
1) The values that tacitly inform students, i.e., what
is at stake The point of departure of GVV is that it is
important to spend classroom time combining (1)
helping students to understand their own tacit values
and how it informs their sense of morally appropriate
action, (2) helping them to find viable ways to act on
their values, and (3) convincing others of the
viability of the morally appropriate course of action.
We thoroughly concur that moving from the ‘‘what’’
to the ‘‘how’’ is an important imperative in business
ethics education, and we believe that this becomes a
more realistic possibility if students reflect on the
way in which stakeholder perceptions of what is
possible in terms of action and conversation are
already shaped by what they tacitly believe. Some of
these tacit beliefs are informed by the ‘‘moral
baggage’’ of the metaphors that are salient within
both the academic environments of business schools
and the world of commence and political discourse
within which the students operate. For instance, in
the case of the ‘‘invisible hand,’’ confused beliefs
regarding who or what the object of the invisible
hand is (Kennedy 2011, p. 55) have shaped students’
belief about fair business conduct. If students mis-
takenly believe that the market is the invisible hand,
they will not only abdicate their own responsibility
for effecting fairness, but also resist government
intervention to protect vulnerable stakeholders. They
will also be less likely to question their own pursuit
of self-interest. It will also make it very difficult for
them to counter arguments for seeking self-interest
before attending to the interests of others, which has
implications for both (1) and (2) of the GVV case
analysis process, i.e., acknowledging the stakes of all
involved and challenging the arguments for unethical
action. As part of empowering students to consider
how to enact fairness, a reconsideration of the tacit
beliefs that inform their sense of fairness would be
appropriate. As we saw above, the GVV methodol-
ogy does lend itself to this analysis, as it enables
them to view something like ‘‘fairness’’ from various
stakeholder points of view. In the process, they may
discover that their own tacit assumptions make them
blind to what is at stake for others. The kind of
analysis appropriate to the GVV approach is more
pragmatic than the analysis Gentile (2012) describes
as part of the traditional way of teaching business
ethics. It does not only ask students to consider what
the right thing to do might be and what is at stake for
everyone involved, but also how to do what they
believe is right by engaging with their own preju-
dices and assumptions, and conversing with others
about their own value-priorities. In line with the kind
of analytical thinking embedded in the GVV
approach, we believe that students’ accounts of their
understanding of ‘‘fairness,’’ for instance, or their
rationalizations regarding why they chose not to act,
will offer rich material for understanding their own
tacit beliefs and for challenging the assumptions
underpinning the beliefs of other stakeholders. This
brings us to another implication of our reconsider-
ation of the invisible hand metaphor.
2) Developing critical capacities and challenging
rationalizations As our Nietzsche analysis
4 http://www.babson.edu/Academics/teaching-research/gvv/Pages/
curriculum.aspx. Last visited May 27, 2016.
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suggested, understanding one’s own desires and
insecurities is central to one’s process of valuation.
Smith would agree and, like Nietzsche, believed
that it was possible to challenge one’s own adher-
ence to values, as well as common conceptions of
values in society, be they informed by religion,
politics, or the market. This, however, requires
understanding one’s own desires and those of
others. Smith’s use of the ‘‘invisible hand’’
metaphor offers us a glimpse at how, at a certain
historical juncture, rich people’s pursuit of personal
security serendipitously fed some others. It was not
intended as a moral prescription, but as a candid
look at ‘‘the unintended consequences of individual
actions’’ (Kennedy 2009, p. 241). If the metaphoric
belief in the power of the invisible hand now tacitly
shapes our students’ values, we may challenge them
to question whether how desires for security and
esteem may be satisfied within the political econ-
omy of our contemporary society. Our analysis of
the ‘‘impartial spectator’’ and a more powerful
metaphor for stimulating the moral imagination not
only allows us to into this students’ capacity for
critical reflection, but also allows us to move them
toward responsible action.
3) Strengthening students’ resolve to act on their
values Tapping into student’s embodied desires for
respect and harmony becomes important, especially
with regard to what they have come to believe
deserves respect, and facilitates harmony. Smith’s
description of the ‘‘impartial spectator’’ offers us the
opportunity to combine the Enlightenment thinkers’
pursuit of autonomy with a more realistic under-
standing of human beings’ embodied capacities for
sympathy and their need for respect. The impartial
spectator that Smith describes is not the isolated,
rational subject extolled in much of Enlightenment
thought. It is an embodied subject, who has distinct
biases, stands in relationships and has requires
respect to build self-esteem. The best chance this
subject has at procuring the kind of agency worthy of
respect, is to be in touch with others, in order to tap
into the sympathy that makes us human beings, and
can only be appropriate elicited by being in contact
with others outside of our immediate circle of family
and friends. This allows one to challenge one’s own
preoccupation with self-interest, insecurity, and to
critique institutions and common-sense valuations
operating in society. Placing oneself in the position
of a variety of stakeholders via moral imagination is
of course not a new perspective (Werhane 1999), but
it often remains unclear how this can be realistically
accomplished in a world where stakeholders lack
‘‘names and faces.’’ We believe that the GVV
exercises offer an excellent opportunity to tap into
students’ visceral reactions to respectful or disre-
spectful actions. Recalling and relating their own
insecurity, fears, embarrassments in failing to give
voice to values, and their own sense of self-esteem in
managing to act on their values in another case, is
surely important. The question, however, remains
whether the rational process of recalling and
rationalization is the best, or the only way to tap
into students’ desire for respect and self-esteem. One
of the important levers to get the right thing done is
perhaps to allow business decision-makers to expe-
rience the rise and fall of others in pursuit of wealth
and esteem, in order to tap into their capacities for
sympathy. Cautionary tales, as well as tales of
success, that become part of the corporate grapevine
have to be articulated when faced with a values
tension. Seeing someone who is many ways is ‘‘just
like you’’ stumble into unethical conduct and pay the
price, may elicit sympathy. If someone on our team
managed to do the right thing under difficult
circumstances, we may develop admiration and
feelings of pride in our team. By a similar token, if
ruthless individuals become the heroes of the orga-
nization, jealousy or admiration may tempt others to
follow suit. In such cases, showing that they even-
tually get their just desert in terms of punishment,
may instill fear in those who watch them. The actions
of these characters ‘‘voice’’ their values, and our
response to these examples become influential in
what is considered viable or desirable courses of
action. One important way of rewriting and rehears-
ing alternative scripts can be accomplished by having
students experience the moral sentiments that Smith
believed underpins all moral responses. Sometimes
the creation of sympathy, pride or fear is best
accomplished indirectly, through art or literature
(Guillet de Monthoux 2004). Smith himself believed
that literature, poetry, opera and the visual arts lights
the fires of moral imagination (Wright 2007, p. 344).
Exercises that employ students’ visual associations
of well-being, like asking them to pick pictures of the
‘‘happy life’’ or of ‘‘respect’’ from popular magazi-
nes, may also serve to tap into metaphoric concep-
tions of the good life that inform students’ valuation.
4) The ‘‘scripts’’ that shape students’ typical
rationalizations and responses Since GVV employs
rehearsals and scripting of alternative responses in
order to make ethical responses feel more natural.
This process of ‘‘normalization’’ means that doing
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the right thing need not necessarily always be an act
of courage or self-sacrifice, but rather a very practical
action plan that seems viable to all involved. We
believe that GVV again offers an excellent opportu-
nity to do at least two things: Firstly, to help students
understand the way in which tacit adherence to the
moral baggage of certain metaphors inform their gut-
level responses. We believe students have been
influenced by misinterpretations of Smith’s metaphor
to use it as a moral prescript, rather than as an
instrument to use in their own valuation processes.
Our analysis takes up Worden’s (2009) challenge to
rethink the role of philosophy in business ethics
education, replacing moralism with a more genealog-
ical approach to understand our students and our-
selves as teachers. Commentators on Smith have
argued that Smith’s use of the ‘‘invisible hand’’ was
his way to pragmatically make sense of how selfish
individuals take care of others because it is in their
own interest to do so. This implicit calculation of the
‘‘lesser of two evils’’—i.e., feed the poor rather than
lose their labor—is typical of the kind of ‘‘moral
accounting’’ that underpin many moral rationaliza-
tions. In order to help students develop alternative
scripts, it would be important to challenge the
validity of the dominant ones, and to help them
redefine what is at stake in terms of a stronger sense
of purpose (Gentile 2010a, b). This could be
accomplished by exploring conceptions of ‘‘well-
being’’ and perceptions around the ‘‘the lesser of two
evils’’ that already exist within the students’ own
reasoning. Smith’s analysis would demand a candid
look at our own utilitarian calculations, taking into
consideration real human needs in various parts of
the world at this specific historical juncture. His
reference to the invisible hand was a candid, and not
so flattering reflection on his own time, not a
suggestion that we abdicate our own responsibility
to some abstract universal market mechanism. In
terms of offering alternatives, Smith sets the example
of how to hold up the mirror to ourselves and others.
This perspective strengthens GVV’s emphasis on
practical business solutions—the argument is not to
take a kind of moralistic view, but to consider what is
at stake, understand the tacit values in play, and to
find a sympathetic, creative solution. Maybe we do
good because we want to be praised, maybe we do so
without intending it at all. Whatever it is, it would be
helpful to understand our own, and others’ motiva-
tions (or lack thereof), especially in view of having
more meaningful conversations about the realistic
actions in particular contexts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we took up Nietzsche’s challenge to revaluate
our basic moral beliefs and to resist commonsensical moral
truths that emerge through custom or institutional dynam-
ics. We believe that much of the ‘‘moral baggage’’ that the
metaphor of the ‘‘invisible hand’’ carries is not only mis-
guided, but also constraining. Commonplace interpreta-
tions of the invisible hand allow individuals to abdicate
their moral responsibility, and to blunt their moral sensi-
bilities. A rereading of Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ reminds
us of the imperatives of seeking harmony, which not only
allows us a sense of self-esteem, but also allows us to
develop appropriate forms of sympathy and concern for
others. It may afford us the opportunity to create corporate
interactions that could allow companies and individuals
contact with others who are not like them, and who live in
very different ways. This may allow our students to explore
various creative possibilities for relationship and commu-
nity that are not strictly defined in terms of gathering
monetary wealth.
In the second place, our analysis offers an argument for
contextually specific sense-making, which allows us to
reflect on our own desires for security, wealth, and esteem at
specific historical junctures. Smith’s three references to the
‘‘invisible hand’’ each has its own context, and therefore its
own meaning. If we take Smith’s example, we may be able
to reflect on our own moral calculations, albeit after the fact.
This is only possible if we continually consider the con-
textual variables as they emerge. There are no hard-and-fast
rules regarding business conduct, institutional arrange-
ments, government intervention, or interpersonal relation-
ships. Life systems are always evolving, and as Nietzsche
explains, this influences our processes of ongoing valuation.
We believe that our analysis of Smith’s invisible hand
can supplement the ‘‘Giving Voice to Values’’ pedagogical
approach in important ways. These suggestions will,
however, have to be empirically explored, which offers
numerous possibilities for future research with different
groups of students around the globe. Further studies on
creative ways to engender sympathy in a faceless global
context would also have to be considered. In this regard,
closer cooperation between business schools and the arts
and humanities would be important. Cross-sectoral coop-
eration between governments, NGOs, and educational
institutions would also be needed to allow students to
become aware of the distinct moral scripts operating in
different environments. The goal would be to challenge a
simplistic adherence to worn-out rationalizations. We
believe that rethinking our adherence to ‘‘invisible hands,’’
wherever we may encounter them, would be a good place
to start.
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